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Research on the economic consequences of corruption 
has been hampered by the inability to directly measure 
corruption. Using an innovative methodology that 
allows respondents to report individual experiences with 
corruption while minimizing self-incrimination and an 
objective diagnostic to evaluate lying (false responses), 
this paper explores the extent of business corruption 
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in Bangladesh. The analysis shows that traditional 
measures of corruption underreport the extent of 
business corruption in Bangladesh and existing strategies 
to evaluate and elicit truthful responses have limited 
effectiveness. The authors identify the types of firms that 
are associated with false responses and nonresponses to 
survey questions on corruption. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  The relationship between corruption and business activity has long been a 
contentious area of research.  Corruption can impose a tax on business, which is not only 
costly to individuals and firms—it can be arbitrary and unpredictable.  It can also affect 
the incentives of firms and investors, increasing rent seeking activity.  Yet, corruption can 
also increase economic efficiency, where it greases the wheels of business, either as a 
collusion between public officials and firms, or simply a mechanism that increases the 
efficiency of business by using informal mechanisms to overcome formal barriers to 
economic activities.     
In this paper we examine the extent of business corruption in a survey of firms in 
Bangladesh.  Isolating our study to a single country allows us to sidestep many of the 
difficult cross-national comparisons of individual responses to survey questions.  Yet our 
research project is confronted with the same empirical research design issue as literally 
decades of scholarship: the measurement of corruption.   
The most serious problem with corruption research is the ability to directly 
measure corruption.  Corruption often entails illegal and unethical activities where one or 
all parties have incentives to conceal corrupt acts.  Thus one response to this 
measurement problem is to rely on the opinions of experts on the levels of corruption.  
Unfortunately, this fails to uncover the vast differences in experiences with corruption 
across firms, and still suffers from the same measurement problem.  If these experts 
aren’t directly observing “corruption” what information are they using to evaluate the 
level of corruption?   3 
Thus recent research on corruption has shifted from expert opinion on the overall 
level of corruption to firm-level surveys on individual experiences with corruption.  This 
allows for directly measuring corruption and leaves room for variation across firms. 
Unfortunately, this firm level analysis requires us to rely on self-assessments of firms.  If 
these questions are politically sensitive, personally embarrassing, or could lead to 
criminal sanctions, we should be dubious about the incentives of firms to provide truthful 
answers. 
One strategy used within surveys is to ask the enumerator to evaluate the level of 
truthfulness of the respondent.  This strategy has the strength of allowing enumerators, 
often during face to face interviews, evaluate the truthfulness of respondents.  Yet these 
are based on perception that can be biased, and they are based on overall evaluations of 
truthfulness, and not linked to specific questions.  We directly illustrate the limits of this 
approach within our survey. 
To evaluate the extent of truthfulness we utilize a randomized response technique 
(RRT).  This strategy is simply to have respondents flip a coin for each question we ask.  
If the coin turns up heads, the respondent automatically responds as “yes”, and is 
instructed to answer truthfully if the coin turns up tails.  If respondents are answering 
questions truthfully, at least half of the response should be “yes” (since 50% of the coin 
flips should be heads).  If we find that responses to corruption questions answer “no” 
more than half of the time, there is systematic false responses on the survey.  Our survey 
results do indeed show systematic false responses on politically sensitive questions such 
as levels of corruption and the extent of tax evasion.  We find that the same types of firms   4 
that have a propensity to provide false responses to our RRT are also the firms that are 
likely to provide nonresponses to direct questions on corruption. 
Our paper proceeds as follows.  In section two we provide a brief overview of the 
relationship between corruption and investment.  In section 3 we provide an overview of 
our research design and data and present our results.  In section 4 we provide a 
descriptive discussion of patterns of nonresponse and potential false responses.  Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Corruption and Firm Investment 
There is a large body of literature exploring the relationship between business 
corruption and economic outcomes.  At a minimum, corruption is a tax on business 
(Vernon 1971, 1977; Wells 1977; Ackerman 1975a, 1975b, 1999) that increases the costs 
of firm operations.  Yet the cost of corruption can be much greater than the direct costs.  
First, corruption can disadvantage the international investments from firms headquartered 
in countries with strong anti-corruption laws (Cuervo-Cazurra 2006).  For example, the 
passage of the 1977 U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, (e.g., Graham 1984; Kim and 
Barone 1981) led to a decrease in U.S. investment in countries with higher levels of 
corruption.    This can advantage firms from countries with weaker anti-corruption laws. 
Second, its negative impact is greater than a transparent tax because illegality requires 
secrecy (Schleifer and Vishny 1993).  Third, corruption can increase rent-seeking, 
distorting economic decisions (Kreuger 1974; Bhagwati 1982; Murphy et al 1995).  
These negative impacts, both direct and indirect, of corruption may deter 
domestic and foreign investment (Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Knack and Keefer 1995;   5 
Lambsdorff 2003; Mauro 1995, 1998; Wei 2000).
2   This impact can be heightened when 
corruption is unpredictable (Campos, Lien, and Pradhan 1999; Malesky and 
Samphantharak 2008).  Finally, the structure of corruption, specifically if there is a single 
agency demanding rents or if multiple agents all have opportunities for corruption, affects 
both the level and the impact of corruption (Olken and Barron 2009). 
  Unfortunately, measuring corruption requires novel research design strategies for 
a number of reasons.  First, firm managers may be generally reluctant to answer 
politically sensitive questions (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2005; Azfar and Murrell 2009).  This 
reluctance can stem from social factors, where firm managers may be hesitant to express personal 
beliefs that are considered taboo.
3  Second, and more relevant for this paper, the political 
environment can affect responses to firm level surveys.  Jensen, Li, and Rahman (2010) 
analyze cross-national firm-level Productivity and Investment Climate Surveys (PICS) 
administered by the World Bank.  They find evidence for nonresponse and false response 
on corruption questions in the PICS survey.  Specifically, in countries with lower levels 
of Press Freedom and Political Freedom, a larger percentage of firms tend to provide 
false response to the corruption questions and a large number of responses fit patterns of 
false response.  They find that in countries with lower levels of press and political 
freedom, firm-level survey data tends to underreport levels of corruption. 
  In this paper we take seriously the potential for nonresponse and false responses 
in the firm level surveys.  In fact, we design a survey methodology to examine patterns of 
nonresponse and false response on survey questions on corruption.  Our methodology 
                                                 
2 Corruption can also affect firm entry strategies (Henisz 2000; Rodriguez et al. 2005; Uhlenbruck et al. 
2006) or alter other aspects of their operations (Kwok and Tadesse 2006; Luo 2006).  
3 For example, see Berinsky (1999) for work on public opinion and school integration in the United States.   6 
helps to identify and correct for these responses, whether they are generated by social or 
political factors. 
 
3.  Research Design, Data and Analysis 
  To explore the relationship between investment and corruption, we utilize the 
Bangladesh Business Confidence Survey from the 4
th Quarter of 2009.   This business 
confidence survey was conducted on a quarterly basis from the first quarter of 2009 to the 
first quarter of 2010 by the Bangladesh Investment Climate Fund involving leading 
Bangladeshi survey research firms
4. The objective of the survey is to read the pulse of the 
economy and the mood of the business community on a quarterly basis. Typically, the 
owners or the managers of the firms were surveyed in a nationally representative sample 
of firms covering all the six divisions of the country. In the survey, business owners or 
managers report on their current business situation compared to the immediate past and 
anticipate business conditions for the near future in terms of investment, employment, 
and profitability. Jointly with one of more leading business chambers, BICF disseminate 
the survey findings in a high profile national workshop in the presence of key policy 
makers of the government such as the Commerce Minister, Prime Minister’s advisers, 
leading economists and development practitioners, private sector leaders, business 
community, and representatives from relevant government organizations, which captures 
the extensive print and electronic media coverage.  The role of government officials in 
the dissemination of the survey isn’t unique Bangladesh Business Confidence Survey, 
                                                 
4 The Bangladesh Investment Climate Fund (BICF) provides advisory services aimed at improving business 
operating environment in Bangladesh. BICF is managed by IFC, in partnership with the U.K Department 
for International Development and the European Union. BICF administered the first two quarterly surveys 
jointly with the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute and the subsequent rounds with the OrgQuest Research 
Limited.    7 
and that this government involvement can cause nonresponse and false responses on 
politically sensitive questions.
5 This is especially important since the survey includes a 
set of questions on the operations of firms, firms’ experience in dealing with different 
government authorities, and the effects of different government policies on firm 
investment. Later in this paper we outline our strategy to deal with potential nonresponse 
and false response by including list of randomized experiment questions for our 
analytical purposes.  
  Our survey wave includes a total of 1,417 owners or managers spread across all of 
the six administrative divisions, although the largest percentage of firms (45.07%) are 
located  around the capital,  Dhaka, the center of most of the economic activities of the 
country.  The nationally representative firms in this survey, mirroring the universe of 
firms in Bangladesh, tend to be small, with over half of the firms employing less than 10 
workers, and less than 7% employing more than 50 workers.  This includes a mix of 
newer and older firms, where slightly more than 50% of the firms were established before 
1999.  Finally, the firms in the survey are almost evenly split between firms in urban 
areas and rural areas (51.67% to 48.33% respectively). 
  The largest number of these firms are located in the manufacturing sector 
(33.61%) followed by wholesale and retail trade (21.94%), finance (13.82%), and hotel 
and restaurant (10.83%).  The vast majority of these manufacturing firms are in the textile 
industry engaging in the production of garments, leather goods, or other textiles.
6    
  Unfortunately, Bangladesh’s low levels of development and limited success in 
attracting foreign investment doesn’t allow for sufficient variation in ownership structure 
                                                 
5 Jensen, Li, and Rahman (2010). 
6 This sector accounts for 23.82% of the firms in our sample, and over 70% of the manufacturing firms.   8 
for us to make comparisons across owners.  Only 5.14% of the firms in our survey are 
publicly listed and over 67% are sole proprietorships.  Only 8 observations are foreign 
owned firms and 26 observations are government owned enterprises.  This lack of 
variation in ownership type limits our ability to analyze how different ownership types 
affect firm’s experiences with corruption. 
While the limited variation in the types of firms operating in Bangladesh 
constrains our ability to examine certain questions, such has the differences in foreign 
versus domestic firm experiences with corruption, Bangladesh has other advantages for 
the study of how corruption affects firm activities.   Bangladesh ranks 134 out of 178 in 
2010 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and is thus one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world. Bangladesh ranks in the bottom third in global governance 
indices such as the Doing Business rankings, the World Bank Institute (WBI) indicators 
for government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption.  Reviews of the 
country’s governance, most notably by Bangladeshi experts such as BRAC University’s 
State of Governance Reports, have noted entrenched problems in many key public 
institutions (IGS 2009).    
Our research on corruption and investment in Bangladesh complements existing 
cross-national and single country studies of corruption.  Researchers attempting to 
measure firm level corruption have the options of directly asking respondents on the level 
of corruption, or ask firms about their overall perceptions of corruption.  The first 
strategy requires firms to potentially incriminate themselves, while the second strategy 
requires meaningful subjective assessments.
7 
                                                 
7 Olken (2009) finds that individual perceptions of corruption, while containing some information, is highly 
noisy and subject to bias.   9 
  The first question we explore is a routinely asked question in the Bangladesh 
survey on changes in the level of corruption.  The question asks about increases or 
decreases in the level of corruption over the last quarter.  The exact wording of this 
question is presented in the Appendix.   
  In Table 1, we present the responses from 1,417 firms surveyed.  These results 
indicate a general stability in the level of corruption, with a slightly higher percentage of 
managers (21.81%) indicating a decrease in corruption compared with that who indicates 
an increase in corruption (13.83%).  These results provide some insights into changing 
levels of corruption over time, one of the important drivers in changes in business 
activities (investment, sales, etc).  These general questions on corruption mask important 
differences in firm managers’ personal experiences with corruption.  General levels of 
corruption may have a low correlation with actual firm experiences with corruption. 
Table 1: Evaluations of Changes in Corruption 
 
  Number  Percent 
No Response  230  16.23% 
Much Lower  54  3.81% 
Somewhat Lower  309  21.81% 
About the Same  582  41.07% 
Somewhat Higher  196  13.83% 
Much Higher  46  3.25% 
   Total  1,417  100% 
 
An alternative approach is to directly ask firms about their evaluation of the role 
of corruption in affecting business activity.  The second question that we explore is a 
question on the relationship between a number of different factors and business activity.  
Along with a number of questions related to economic factors affecting business, one   10 
question includes an evaluation of corruption (Question J).  We present the exact wording 
of this questions and potential responses in the Appendix.  
Table 2: Evaluations of Impact of Corruption on Business Activity 
 
  Number  Percent 
Very negative  37  2.61% 
Moderately negative  370  26.11% 
No impact  865  61.04% 
Moderately positive  127  8.96% 
Very positive  18  1.27% 
   Total  1,417  100% 
 
  As presented in Table 2, the majority of firms respond that corruption has no 
impact on their business.  Unfortunately, the collection of the survey data doesn’t allow 
us to differentiate “No impact” from the responses providing nonresponses and are thus 
coded as no impact.  The sizeable minority of firms claiming corruption has a moderately 
negative impact (26.11%) is important, and has clear policy relevance.  But do these 
levels of corruption distort investment decisions and ultimately have a negative impact on 
economic performance?   
  Unfortunately, these two corruption questions presented may suffer from a 
number of problems.  The first question asks a general subjective assessment of the level 
of corruption, while the second asks a specific question on how corruption affects the 
business environment.  Broad questions on corruption may not inform us about firm 
experiences with corruption, with firm specific question on experiences with corruption 
may lead managers to use nonresponse and false responses to minimize any legal or 
political repercussions (Jensen, Li, and Rahman 2010).  
  Our approach is to utilize a series of questions based on a “coin flip” method of 
randomization of questions, often called a randomized response technique (RRT) that we   11 
included on the 4
th Quarter Bangladesh Business Confidence Survey.  We ask a series of 
ten questions of varying political sensitivity.  This ranges from questions about 
underpaying taxes and paying bribes to using the office phone for personal use.  The 
method and structure of these questions comes from Azfar and Murrell (2009) and 
Clausen et al (2010). While we build on this existing method, we use this approach to 
both to identify the types of firms that are likely providing false responses to corruption 
questions.   
  The instructions provided to the survey administer for our coin flip strategy are: 
[Instructions:  Respondents are given a coin.  If they flip heads, the respondent should 
answer  “yes.”    Otherwise  the  respondent  should  respond  to  the  questions.    The 
enumerator shouldn’t observe the toss.] 
 
  We present the exact questions in the Appendix (Question 3).  We include 
politically non-sensitive questions such as if the respondent has ever lied in their own 
self-interest or used a work phone for a personal call.  Other questions are designed to be 
highly sensitive, such as if the respondent pays less in taxes than they should in taxes.  
Our main question on corruption focuses on a very specific form of corruption relevant 
for starting and expanding business.  Our question is, “Did your business have to pay a 
bribe to get permits to start a business?”  
  This randomized response technique (RRT) can help mitigate a number of 
problems with potential false responses to surveys.  First, it allows respondents 
deniability for any illegal or unethical answers given in the survey.  For example, one 
question asks if the manager’s firm pays less than they should in taxes.  Firms responding 
“yes” to this question can credibly claim that their “yes” response was driven by 
randomization, rather than an admission of guilt.  Second, this question is a specific,   12 
objective question about corruption.  Thus there is less concern about subjective 
evaluations or anchoring problems affecting responses.  Third, we can explore the pattern 
of responses to examine if there is underreporting of specific events, or if specific 
respondents answer in a pattern that is consistent with false responses. 
A more formal way to present this is if we have no false responses or 
underreporting of corruption we can interpret the probabilities as: 
P[Yes] = q + (1-q) * (0.5)  
The probability of a respondent of answering yes is a function of the probability of the 
respondent paying a bribe (q) and the probability of observing heads in the coin flip (0.5).  
For example, if 60% of respondents have paid a bribe, we should expect to observe 80% 
of respondents answering yes to our question.  If no firms pay bribes we should observe 
50% of respondents answering yes to our question. 
  Let us include a term, p, for respondents that are unwilling to answer yes to the 
random response questions. 
P[Yes] = (1-p)q + (1-p)(1-q)(0.5) 
To use the examples from above, if 60% of respondents have paid a bribe, but 10% of the 
managers are unwilling to answer “yes” on our survey, 72% of respondents will answer 
yes.  If there is no corruption and 10% are still reluctant to answer “yes”, we should 
observe 45% of respondents answering yes. 
In Figure 1 we present data on the percentage of yes responses.  For six of the 
questions, respondents answered higher than 0.5, providing no prima facie evidence of 
systematic false responses. 
   13 















































































































































































For four of the questions, responses are less than 0.5, including three politically 
sensitive questions on taxes, bribing police, and our main question on bribing to obtain 
business permits.  For the question on tax evasion the mean response is 0.3811, indicating 
that at least 23% of firms are providing false responses to this questions.  Turning the 
questions on bribing the police and paying bribes for permits, at least 6% of respondents 
are providing false responses.  This is assuming zero tax evasion and bribery (a very bold 
assumption that contradicts other measures of corruption in Bangladesh).  If we assume 
that at least 50% of firms paid some sort of bribe, as much as 35% of firms are providing 
false responses.  
 
   14 
4.  The Determinants of Non-Responses and Potential False Responses 
In the previous section we showed that there is a significant underreporting of 
political sensitive acts, including corruption.  Unfortunately, this underreporting makes it 
impossible for us to know the true extend of corruption in Bangladesh, or to directly 
evaluate the impact of corruption on business activities.  But these systematic false 
responses to our RRT questions does allow us to evaluate the types of firms that provide 
potential false responses, and how these firms answer direct questions on corruption. 
  One quick evaluation we can make in our context is the determinants of 
nonresponse bias.  As noted, firms often fail to answer direct questions on corruption, 
leading to potential nonresponse bias.  To evaluate this bias we compare our corruption 
question using a RRT, and compare it to the direct questions about corruption (Question 
1 in the Appendix).  The first obvious point is that while 226 firms (16%) failed to 
answer the direct question about corruption, we had a 0% response rate using our coin-
flip strategy.  This is important as Jensen, Li, and Rahman (2010) show that even 
relatively low levels of nonresponse can lead to major biases in empirical analyses.  This 
is especially problematic if there are systematic differences in either firm-level or country 
level attributes that lead to nonresponse.  For example, Jensen, Li, and Rahman (2010) 
find that nonresponse rates lead to a dramatic underreporting of corruption in countries 
with less media freedom. 
  What types of firms are likely to provide nonresponses to direct questions on 
corruption?  We find no systematic difference on perceptions of their future firm 
performance, whether the firm was located in an urban and rural area.  While we did find   15 
some differences across regions, this was mostly driven by a very low nonresponse rate 
of 3.8% in one of the smaller administrative regions (Barisal). 
  One strong relationship we find in the data is how the types of firms that failed to 
answer direction questions on corruption, and firm answers on the RRT questions on 
paying bribes.   We find that a large number of firms that failed to answer the direct 
corruption question, when answering the RRT, indicated no incidence of bribery.  Our 
data shows that firms that indicated bribes were used to obtain permits in the randomized 
response question had a 6% lower nonresponse rate (13%) than firms that indicated 
bribery wasn’t used to obtain permits (19%) in the direct corruption questions.
8  Or, put 
another way, the mangers that answered the direct question on corruption had a much 
higher rate of answer “yes” on the using bribes to obtain permits (61.7%) relative to firms 
that firms that failed to responded to the corruption question (50.1%).    
  This result could fly in the face of the idea that the firms failing to respond to 
corruption questions are more likely to engage in corruption.  This descriptive data 
suggests that firms that fail to answer direct questions on corruption are less likely to 
have engaged in bribes.  What explains this pattern?  One possibility is that the firms that 
fail to answer direct questions on corruption are also likely to underreport corruption in 
the RRT.  In short, firms providing nonresponses to some sets of politically sensitive 
questions could be the same firms providing false responses to other questions.  
How do we evaluate potential false responses?  One strategy commonly employed 
in surveys is to instruct enumerators to evaluate the perceived truthfulness of the 
respondent.  In our survey of firms, enumerators were instructed to classify respondents 
as “very truthful”, “somewhat truthful” or “somewhat untruthful” or “very untruthful” at 
                                                 
8 The exact differences is .0588 with a standard deviation of .0196 .    16 
the end of the interview.  In our data of 1,417 respondents, 46 enumerators classified 
1,071 respondents (75.51%) as “very truthful”, 341 (24.06%) “somewhat truthful” and 6 
“somewhat untruthful” (0.42%).  On the surface, these subjective evaluations provide us 
the ability to identify potentially untruthful respondents. 
  Unfortunately, this strategy is subjective to measurement error.  In our data, we 
find that that the vast majority of cases of “somewhat truthful” or “somewhat untruthful” 
are concentrated in one region, Chittagong.  While this region contains an important port 
city which could lead to higher levels of corruption, we find that across the region and 
across industries within Chittagong, firms are much more likely to be rated as less than 
very truthful.  This stark regional pattern could lead researchers to infer that the region, or 
the type of firms in the region, are more prone to false response. 
  Our survey, like many firm level surveys, is organized by region.  Thus teams of 
enumerators, supervised by a single individual, are assigned to survey firms within a 
single region.  Chittagong’s team surveyed 264 firms, where each of the six enumerators 
individually surveyed between 33-52 firms.  While the other five teams evaluated 75%-
100% of firms as “very truthful” the Chittagong team only evaluated 17.80% as very 
truthful, and 81.06% as “somewhat truthful” and the remaining 1.14% as “somewhat 
untruthful.”   
Given the lack of theoretical reasons to suspect such high levels of systematic 
lying in this one region we suspect that this subjective perception suffers from serious 
anchoring problems.  The Chittagong team is likely to evaluate firms as “somewhat 
truthful” while the other teams are more likely to evaluate firms “very truthful.”  Thus the   17 
major variation within this data is likely driven by different interpretations of 
“truthfulness” or other biases that affect the subjective evaluation of truthfulness. 
Given the difficulty in identifying false response with the subjective evaluations, 
how do we evaluate the level of false responses?   Using a randomized response 
technique can also identify the questions that are most likely to elicit false responses and 
some indirect evidence on the exact firms providing false response.  Imagine a situation 
where there is no corruption in Bangladesh (no bribes paid to the police or for business 
permits) and firms always pay the full amount of taxes owed.  Our coin-flip strategy 
would assure that for these three questions, the mean answer for each of these questions 
should be 0.5 (half the respondents flip heads and answer yes, the other half answer 
truthful “no”).  Thus, for an individual question on bribes, we should expect a mean of at 
least 50% “yes” responses.   
By evaluating patterns of answers to politically sensitive questions allows us to 
examine the potential for false responses.  We identify three politically sensitive 
questions (bribing police, paying bribes for permits, and paying less taxes than legally 
owed) that are most likely to elicit false responses from managers.  Only for mangers that 
flip tails three times in a row (predicted as 12.5% of respondents) should we observe 
answers of “no” for all three of questions.  Again, this is making the very conservative 
assumption of no bribery and no tax evasion. 
  A total of 321 firms, or 22.65% of the sample, answered no to all three of these 
questions.  Thus if there is no bribery and full tax payments, there is still at least 10% of 
the sample is providing false responses.  Interestingly, the subjective evaluations of 
enumerators does a very poor job in identifying these firms, where enumerators evaluated   18 
80.37% of firms in our sample of potential false responses as “very truthful” relatively to 
74.09% “very truthful” in the rest of the sample.  Consistent with our explanation earlier, 
enumerator’s subjective evaluations are more likely capturing differences in individual 
enumerator perceptions than real differences in false responses across firms. 
While our strategy doesn’t allow us to definitively identify which firms are lying, 
we can compare the attributes of firms that are likely to having provided false responses 
(answering no to all three politically sensitive questions) to other firms in the sample.  
What do the firms providing potential false responses look like relative to other firms?  
Comparing the 321 firms that answered no to all three politically sensitive 
questions to the rest of the sample, we find a few descriptive aspects of these firms 
different.  Firms coded as providing potential false responses are more likely to be in the 
service sector.  The capital region and largest city (Dhaka) has a higher incidence of 
potential false responses than the rest of the country (27.29% to 18.90%).   
  Our sample consists of almost all domestically owned, small firms and only 23 of 
1,417 firms are government owned.  Interestingly, 19 of 23 of these firms did not respond 
to the direct questions on corruption, and 13 of 23 answered “no” too all three of our 
politically sensitive coin flip questions.  While this small sample size makes us skeptical 
that we can draw any definite conclusions, this pattern is at least suggestive that 
ownership structure could be on potential driver of nonresponse and false response bias. 
  Finally, the most dramatic difference we find is related to our earlier points on 
nonresponse bias.  The firms we identify as giving potential false responses to the RRT 
questions are actually much more likely to provide nonresponses to direct questions on 
corruption than other firms in the sample (21.18% to 14.78%).  This suggests that   19 
nonresponse bias and false responses are generated by the same type of firms.  Firms that 
fail to answer questions about corruption are also the most likely to exhibit patterns of 
answers consistent with false responses.  Thus, while our randomized response technique 
helps provide anonymity for firms answering politically sensitive questions, there’s still a 
subset of firms that most likely systematically underreport corruption.     
We formally examine the determinants of nonresponse to the corruption question 
in Table 3.  In Model 1 we present a probit regression on the determinants of nonresponse 
bias using our indicator for potential false responses as the dependent variable.  If 
nonresponse is random, we should expect no significant relationship between our 
covariates and nonresponse rates.  Our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable 
coded as 1 if the manager failed to answer the direct question on corruption.  Our probit 
regression includes dummy variables for the different regions, and a dummy variable for 
manufacturing firms (Manufacturing). 
The first three models examine the relationship between responses to questions on 
the three politically sensitive questions (Bribe Permits, Bribe Police, Less Taxes) and 
nonresponse to the direct question on corruption.  For all three questions, firms that 
answered “yes” questions on bribery or tax evasion (coded as 1 in our data) were more 
likely to answer the direct question on corruption (coded as a 0 for the nonresponse 
variable).  The final variable, (False Response), is a dummy variable for firms that 
answered no to the three politically sensitive questions.   20 
Table 3: Determinants of Nonresponse 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
         
Location: Dhaka  0.968***  1.004***  0.995***  0.975*** 
  (0.270)  (0.269)  (0.272)  (0.270) 
         
Location: Chittagong  0.687**  0.701**  0.679**  0.682** 
  (0.281)  (0.279)  (0.283)  (0.281) 
         
Location: Rajshahi  0.912***  0.951***  0.952***  0.916*** 
  (0.279)  (0.277)  (0.280)  (0.279) 
         
Location: Khulna  0.582*  0.586*  0.583*  0.551* 
  (0.305)  (0.303)  (0.304)  (0.305) 
         
Location: Sylhet  0.817***  0.841***  0.838***  0.808*** 
  (0.298)  (0.298)  (0.301)  (0.299) 
         
Location: Barisal  -0.141  -0.145  -0.141  -0.138 
  (0.089)  (0.088)  (0.089)  (0.088) 
         
Manufacturing  0.172*  0.173*  0.169*  0.167* 
  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.089) 
         
Bribe for Permits  -0.196**       
  (0.082)       
         
Bribe Police    -0.190**     
    (0.082)     
         
Less Taxes      -0.186**   
      (0.084)   
         
False Response        0.225** 
        (0.098) 
         
Constant  -1.724***  -1.752***  -1.763***  -1.861*** 
  (0.267)  (0.266)  (0.265)  (0.265) 
         
Observations  1,417  1,417  1,417  1,417 
R-squared  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Chi-squared  33.53  35.67  33.08  33.55 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Our empirical analysis confirms the descriptive patterns highlighted earlier.  
Firms that we identify as providing potential false responses RRT questions are more 
likely to fail to response to the direct question on corruption. This impact is statistically 
significant and substantially large.  Firms that we identify as providing potential false 
responses using by looking at the number of “no” answers to the randomized response 
questions are 11.51% more likely to fail to respond to direct questions on corruption.
9  
Given that 16.2% of managers failed to response to direct questions on corruption, this is 
a sizeable impact. 
What are the implications of this research for the understanding of corruption?  
One important question is how corruption is related to firm’s investment decisions.  The 
relationship between firm investment and levels of corruption are inconclusive using data 
on the respondent evaluations of the changes in corruption over time and how corruption 
affects the firm’s business.   
In Table 4 we present a series of probit regressions on the determinants of firm 
investment.  Our dependent variable is an indicator coded as one if the firm has invested 
in fixed capital in the last three months and zero otherwise.
10  First we include a vector of 
control variables for the manager, including a dummy variable if this is the managers first 
business (First Business), a count of the number of years the manger has experience in 
this line of business (Manager Experience).  For robustness we also included variable on 
manager education and gender. We also include a number of control variables at the level 
of the firm, including dummy variables for the size of the business (Medium and Large  
 
                                                 
9  This predicted probability was calculated using Clarify.  See Tomz et al 2003.  
10 We have no reason to believe that firms would provide false responses to this question.     22 
Table 4:  Determinants of Firm Investment 
 
  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Firm Age  -0.009**  -0.008**  -0.008**  -0.008** 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
First Business  0.00165  0.01  0.0107  0.00897 
  (0.079)  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.073) 
Manager Experience  -0.00279  0.000783  0.000737  0.000471 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Large Firm  0.280*  0.274*  0.283*  0.293** 
  (0.152)  (0.146)  (0.146)  (0.146) 
Medium Sized Firm  0.256***  0.240***  0.245***  0.238*** 
  (0.081)  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074) 
         
Urban  0.213***  0.200***  0.203***  0.205*** 
  (0.083)  (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.075) 
Location: Dhaka  1.212***  1.254***  1.250***  1.231*** 
  (0.197)  (0.188)  (0.189)  (0.189) 
Location: Chittagong  0.988***  0.930***  0.933***  0.941*** 
  (0.204)  (0.197)  (0.195)  (0.195) 
Location: Rajshahi  0.891***  0.790***  0.790***  0.753*** 
  (0.210)  (0.200)  (0.199)  (0.200) 
Location: Khulna  0.652***  0.562**  0.564**  0.514** 
  (0.233)  (0.223)  (0.223)  (0.224) 
Location: Sylhet  1.140***  0.985***  0.981***  0.958*** 
  (0.229)  (0.216)  (0.216)  (0.216) 
Location: Barisal  -0.206**  -0.256***  -0.259***  -0.251*** 
  (0.087)  (0.079)  (0.078)  (0.079) 
Corruption Change  0.0416       
  (0.054)       
Corruption Effect    -0.0155     
    (0.061)     
Nonresponse      0.0416   
      (0.097)   
False Response        0.227** 
        (0.091) 
Constant  -0.980***  -0.935***  -0.956***  -0.968*** 
  (0.211)  (0.206)  (0.196)  (0.196) 
         
Observations  1,155  1,378  1,378  1,378 
R-squared  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.09 
Chi-squared  132  167.1  167.2  173.2 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Firms), the age of the business (Firm Age), and dummy variables for firms located in 
urban areas (Urban), and region dummy variables.   
  In models 5 and 6 we include the standard measures of corruption, where 
Corruption Change is an ordinal variable from 0 to 2 variable for if the manger’s 
perceives corruption having increased (2), stayed the same (1) or decreased (0) in the last 
quarter.  Corruption Effect is a 0 to 2 ordinal variable on how corruption has affected the 
manger’s firm, which includes categories of corruption having a positive effect on the 
firms (2), no effect (1) or a negative effect on the firm (0).  In both models (and 
alternative specifications), reported corruption has no relationship with firm investment. 
  As noted, we have a sizeable nonresponse rate on corruption questions in our 
survey.  In model 3 we include a dummy variable for Nonresponse.  We find that firms 
that do not respond to the direct question on corruption are no more or no less likely to 
have invested in the third quarter.  This simple descriptive statistic may suggest that 
nonresponse bias, has little impact on our understanding of firm investment decision. 
  Yet, as we note, a sizeable number of firms failing to respond to these questions 
are also the same set of firms that answered “no” to all three of our politically sensitive 
questions.  Using our variable of False Response from our regressions in Table 3, we use 
this as an independent variable.  Our findings suggest that firms that have a high 
likelihood of providing false responses to the corruption are firms that are more likely to 
have invested in the third quarter.   
Simple descriptive statistics paint the same picture.  Of the managers that were coded 0 
on our False Response variable, 50.7% of their firms had invested in the previous quarter.  
This contrasts the firms that were coded as providing potential false responses.  58.06%   24 
of these firms had invested in the previous.  Not only is this 7.36% difference statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, it is substantially large.  
These results indicate a positive relationship between the level of firm investment 
and the firm’s providing potentially false responses to corruption questions.  
Unfortunately there are numerous interpretations of this result since our results do not 
speak to the causal relationship between corruption and investment.  Firms that have 
invested in the past more may be more exposed to corruption (and thus be more prone to 
lie about corruption) or may simply be more sensitive to answering politically sensitive 
questions.  Alternatively, the firms that have benefited the most from corruption may also 
be the firms that are most concerned with providing answers to corruption related 
questions. 
  While we can not definitely tell which of these theories explains this relationship, 
or results, at a minimum, lead to caution in the design of surveys measuring corruption 
and the interpretation on the relationship between corruption and investment.  Firm level 
surveys are plagued by both nonresponse and false response bias that can have a dramatic 
impact on our empirical results and our substantive understanding of corruption.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
Understanding how corruption affects the business environment has important 
academic and public policy implications.  Unfortunately, much of what we know about 
corruption is either through subjective evaluations of country experts or through the use 
of firm-level surveys that are plagued by nonresponse and possibly nonresponse bias.  
Using a firm-level survey of the business environment in Bangladesh, we include a series   25 
of traditional questions on corruption, along with a set of randomized response questions 
to evaluate these problems. 
  Our analysis suggests that there is a large underreporting of corruption in firm-
level surveys.  One mechanism driving these erroneous results is through the systematic 
pattern of nonresponse rates by firms.  We also show evidence that firms providing 
nonresponses are also the types of firms exhibiting patterns of answers consistent with 
false responses.   
Unfortunately, our paper shows that RRT clearly is not a panacea for solving 
problems for biased responses.  Even with the anonymity provided with this technique, 
we observe systematic patterns that suggest at least 10% of the sample is providing false 
responses to survey questions.  Yet this technique does allow researchers to ex post 
evaluate systematic problems with nonresponse and potential false responses in survey 
research.  Perhaps most importantly, it allows us to examine the types of firms (or 
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Appendix 
Question 1:  Corruption Question 
How has the level of corruption been when interacting with officials from public 
institutions been over the period July to September 2009, when compared to the 
previous period of April to June 2009: 
 
a)  Much lower  -2 
b)  Somewhat lower                -1 
c)  About the same  0 
d)  Somewhat higher  1 
e)  Much higher  2 
f)  Not applicable  -7 
 
Question 2: Factors Affecting Business 
To what extent did the following factors affect your business over the period October to 
December 2009?   
 
       (There is only one answer in each line. Please circle the appropriate answer. Scale: 
very negative = -2, moderately negative = -1, no impact = 0, moderately positive = 1, 
very positive = 2, and not applicable=-7)  
  Reason  Scale 
A  Interest rate     -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
B  Exchange rate*      -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
C  Banking credit       -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
D  Inflation       -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
E  Tax rate      -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
F  Energy price (electricity, oil and gas)       -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
G  Transport cost      -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
H  Political Situation    -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
I  Policy uncertainty       -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
J  Corruption     -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
K  Extortion     -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
L  Energy supply (electricity, gas, etc.)      -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
M  Shortage of skilled labor      -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
N  Labor relation/unrest       -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
O  Wage rate      -2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
P  Shortage of raw materials/inadequate input 
supply     
-2  -1  0  1  2  -7 
Q  Possible Repercussions of the Financial Crisis   -2  -1  0  1  2  -7   34 
Question 3: Coin Flip Questions 
[Instructions:  Respondents are given a coin.  If they flip heads, the respondent should 
answer  “yes.”    Otherwise  the  respondent  should  respond  to  the  questions.    The 
enumerator shouldn’t observe the toss.] 
 
a.  Have you personally paid a bribe to a government official in the past twelve months? 
b.  Did you vote for the Prime Minister’s party in the last national election? 
c.  Have you ever been purposely late for work? 
d.  Does your business pay less in business taxes than is required by current tax law? 
e.  Have you personally paid a bribe to police officer in the last twelve months? 
f.  Have you ever used the office phone for personal business? 
g.  Do you believe that corruption benefits the ruling party in Bangladesh? 
h.  Have you ever lied in your own self-interest? 
i.  Did your business have to pay a bribe to get permits to start a business? 
j.  Do most firms have to pay bribes to get permits to start a business?  
 
 